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Across two different contexts,
Kabadayi and Osvath found that
ravens preferentially selected
items that could be used to obtain
future rewards. Do these results
demand a rethink of the evolution
of ﬂexible planning, or are there
leaner alternative explanations for
the performance of ravens?
Many complex and highly adaptive
human behaviors can only be understood
through our capacity to imagine, ﬂexibly
plan for, and actively shape future events.
It has been proposed that this capacity is
unrivaled by any other species and is a
key adaptive strategy that enabled
humans to fundamentally transform and
control ecological niches across the
planet [1,2]. Exactly how unique our
powers of foresight are, however, is con-
troversial [3]. Evidence for the presence of
ﬂexible planning in non-human animals
would raise profound questions about
the evolution of the capacity and what
precisely is distinct about human
foresight.
In an apparently breakthrough study,
Kabadayi and Osvath [4] recently
reported that ravens (Corvus corax) can
ﬂexibly plan for future events in domains
where they have no natural behavioral
predispositions (tool use and bartering).
If correct, this conclusion would indicate
that the capacity must have evolved at
least twice in distinct phylogenetic line-
ages separated by 320 million years of
evolutionary history. Over a series of four
experiments (E1–E4), ﬁve ravens were
given the opportunity to select a tool or
token that could be used to obtain afuture food reward. The birds selected
the correct tool or token signiﬁcantly more
than distractor items in conditions in
which the reward became available
15 minutes (E1) or 17 h (E2) later. They
also selected the correct item signiﬁcantly
more often than a small food reward (E3–
E4), suggesting that they could inhibit a
current preference for food so as to obtain
a greater amount of food in the future.
Although the birds clearly preferred the
appropriate items in these experiments,
it is premature to conclude that ravens
can ﬂexibly plan. Before the ﬁrst experi-
ment the ravens learned how to use the
functional tool and token to obtain food
over ﬁve and 35 training trials, respec-
tively, and they also had the opportunity
to learn that distractor items were non-
functional. All the ravens then selected the
trained items on the ﬁrst experimental
trial, even though they had not experi-
enced a predictable return of the reward
situation and therefore had no reason to
expect a speciﬁc future episode in which
to use them. Thus, a lean alternative
hypothesis is that the learned reward
associations simply made the functional
items more attractive than the distractors,
given that the functional items had been
associated with food more than the
distractors.
One could test associative explanations,
for instance, by pairing distractors and
functional tools equally with reward
before test, or by visibly destroying the
reward apparatus to check if ravens con-
tinue to prefer the previously functional
tool over the small food reward even
when there is no future utility. One could
examine ﬂexibility by making the same
objects functional in one future context
and useless in others. Instead, through-
out the studies the ravens were tested for
selection of the same objects.
The authors infer ﬂexibility because the
ravens selected the target object more
when there was an immediate opportu-
nity to use the items (E4) than when thereTrewas not (E3), but this may reﬂect carry-
over effects because these experiments
were not counterbalanced. That is, the
birds could have learned to choose the
functional object more often because of
their experience in E3, leading to their
increased performance in E4. This could
have occurred in two ways: (i) memory-
mediated reinforcement [5] during E3,
where birds remembered their prior
object choice when they were presented
with the apparatus 15 minutes later, and
paired this memory with the subsequent
outcome (functional item leads to reward;
small food leads to no reward), or (ii) the
association between functional item and
reward could have been stronger in E4 as
a result of repeated pairing of reward and
tool in E3, meaning that the functional
object was more attractive in E4 than
E3, andwas therefore chosenmore often.
In fact, E3 was the second experiment in
the series and occurred before E2 ([7_TD$DIFF][1_TD$DIFF]see
supplementary materials of [4]), and the
ravens therefore had even more opportu-
nity to learn the association between
functional item and reward before E4.
One way to test if the behavior of the
ravens was truly affected by temporal dis-
tance would be to run E3 and E4 twice
such that temporal distance does not
change in a linear fashion that correlates
with experience.
Although the authors suggest that the
capacities of ravens parallel those of great
apes, it is important to acknowledge that
the evidence for animal foresight remains
very controversial [3]. Methodological
criticisms [1,6] have been leveled at the
positive ﬁndings they cite [7,8], and other
studies have failed to ﬁnd evidence of
even elementary components of planning
in great apes, such as preparation for two
alternative event outcomes [9] or for two
sequential and causally linked events [10].
Thus far animal studies have failed to
match the conservative criteria used to
demonstrate competence in children
[11], namely the use of (i) single trials, to
prevent consistent exposure to the same
stimulus–reward relationships, andnds in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 1
TICS 1719 No. of Pages 2demonstrate memory of a past problem
that can be solved at a particular future
occasion; (ii) multiple problems from dif-
ferent domains, to demonstrate ﬂexibility
and domain-general competence, (iii) dif-
ferent temporal and spatial contexts for
exposure to the problem and the crucial
future-directed action, to prevent cuing
and demonstrate a capacity to link past
and future events; and (iv) novel prob-
lems, to preclude the effect of learning
histories and necessitate the use of
future-directed cognitive processes.
Studies of great apes and other primates
are of particular relevance to the evolu-
tionary history of human capacities, and
studies of corvids and other phylogeneti-
cally distant taxa have potential to shed
light on the ecological factors supporting
the emergence of shared traits. However,2 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. ybefore equating cognitive traits between
species and drawing conclusions about
homologies and convergent evolution,
comparative psychologists must carefully
rule out alternative explanations for the
observed behaviors.1Centre for Psychology and Evolution, School of
Psychology, University of Queensland, Australia
2School of Psychology, University of Auckland, New
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